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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROYAL NORDELL ALLRED,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15688

MARK E. COOK, BRYANT MADSEN,
KENNETH R. STRATE and TOM
MOWER,

Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS COOK, MADSEN, AND STRATE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the former superintendent of
the North Sanpete School District against three of the five
members of the North Sanpete School Board.

Plaintiff alleged

in his Complaint that he had been slandered by defendants and
sought general damages of nearly $400,000 and punitive damages
of $1,000,000.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After the filing of Plaintiff's complaint all defendants
filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.

On February 24, 1978 the Honor-

able Don V. Tibbs, District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District,
granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss on the grounds that Defendant
Mower
hadLawa Library.
constitutional
right
participate
the
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney
Funding for digitization provided
by the to
Institute
of Museum and Library in
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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election process of assisting the other defendants to become
members of the School Board, the publication alleged in Plaintiff's complaint did not constitute a slander, and in any
event, Defendants' statements were privileged and Defendants
were immune from the action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents seek affirmance of the Order of the
District Court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since this appeal is based upon the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint this Court must accept the plaintiff's description of facts alleged in the complaint as true but is not
required to accept extrinsic facts not plead nor legal conclusions in contradiction to the pleaded facts.

Sampson v. Rumsey,

563 P.2d 506 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
With this principle of appellate review in mind Plaintiff's
complaint states the following facts:

Plaintiff had been the

Superintendent of Schools of the North Sanpete School District
and enjoyed an excellent reputation as an effective school administrator in his community.

Defendants conspired to remove

Plaintiff from this position and told many people of their desire to do so.

Defendants attacked the qualifications of Plain·

tiff and "in further aid of said scheme and design, the Defendants Cook, Madsen and Strate, with the assistance of the Defen·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dant Mower, sought and obtained election to membership of the
School Board of the North Sanpete School District."

(R., p. 2).

The first encounter with Plaintiff occurred on May 23,
1977 when the Defendants Cook, Madsen and Strate spoke with
Plaintiff in Defendant Strate's car advising him that they
wished to have his resignation within 24 hours and that if his
resignation was not forthcoming 27 charges against him would
be brought out at a public board meeting on May 26, 1977.
Thereafter, each of the defendants told many persons of
their claim that 27 charges would be brought out publicly in
the next meeting and a public outcry resulted.

Defendant Strate

in a town meeting told 40-60 "interested" citizens that Defendants had 27 charges against Plaintiff and invited the people
to come to the board meeting to see what they were.
Subsequently, Plaintiff and his attorney and numerous interested citizens sought to determine what these charges were
but Defendants publicly stated they did not have 27 charges
against Plaintiff nor any charges against him except "the charge
of inadequate leadership, in that Plaintiff did not have support
of the majority of said board."

(R., p. 3) •

In spite of the public disclaimer of these charges Defendants told many persons privately that they had such charges but
would not bring them out because of possible legal consequences.
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendants maliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3- OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

ciously and intentionally made statements and encouraged rumors for the purpose of injuring Plaintiff in his employment
and his professional reputation in the community and that these
actions were done to diminish Plaintiff's influence and to increase Defendants' own influence over the affairs of the North
Sanpete School Board.
Plaintiff stated the following in his complaint:
Even if said statements and rumors are widely
disbelieved, some persons will either believe
them or have doubts whereby Plaintiff is and
will continue to be disadvantaged in his relationship with them. Even among those persons
who do not believe said statements and rumors,
particularly other professional educators,
Plaintiff is and will continue to be disadvantaged and rendered less effective because
he has been rendered by said statements and
rumors "controversial".
(R., p. 4).
Plaintiff further states in his complaint that he cannot
allege the 27 charges "are false, because he does not know what
they are".
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted jointly and severally in their individual capacity but waives any claim against
the North Sanpete School District.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges

damages of $397,000 plus punitive damages of $1,000,000.
Plaintiff does not allege any special damages suffered as
a result of the alleged slander.

He does not allege in his com·

plaint that Defendants Cook, Madsen, and Strate did not have
the power as a school board to terminate his employment or to
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Lawover
Library. Funding
digitization provided by the
Institute
of Museum
and Library
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control
his for
employment.
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not
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dants were acting beyond their official capacity at the time
of the alleged slander.
Based upon this complaint the trial court found as to Defendants Cook, Madsen, and Strate that an actionable slander
had not been stated, that any statements made by the defendants
were privileged, and that the school board members were immune.
It is from this order that this appeal is taken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A
CLAIM OF ACTIONABLE SLANDER.
Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Claim of Slander Per
Se or Slander Per Quod.
Defamatory words are either actionable per se or per quod.
Those which are injurious upon their face and without extrinsic
aid are defamatory per se; but if insinuations, innuendoes, colloquium or explanatory circumstances are necessary either to
explain the person intended or the defamatory character, they
are only actionable per quod and require pleadings and proof of
special damages to the complaining party.
444 P.2d 968

Ramsey v. Zeigner,

(N.M. 1968).

Since Plaintiff has made no allegation of special damages
resulting from the alleged libelous statements the ruling of
the trial court must be upheld unless it is assumed, as a matter of law, that the alleged statements made by Defendants conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-5-OCR, may contain errors.

stituted slander per se.

Western States Title Insurance Com-

pany v. warnock, 415 P.2d 316 (Utah 1966).
For words to be libelous per se their injurious character
must be a fact of such common notoriety as to be established
by the common consent of men so that damage from the publication of such words may be presumed.

££·•

Nichols v. Daily Reporter

30 Utah 74, 83 P. 573 (1902).
It is generally recognized that per se defamation results

from words imputing a matter incompatible with a person's business, trade or profession or a criminal offense.

Restatement

Cf the Law, 2d, Torts, Section 570.
Section 573 of the Restatement of Torts states that one
who publishes a slander that ascribes to another conduct,
characteristics or a condition that would adversely affect his
fitness for the conduct of his trade or profession is subject
to liability without proof of special harm.

This section is

clear, however, that any alleged slanderous remarks must be specifically directed to the qualities necessary for the person's
profession and not general defamatory remarks.

The Comment to

this section gives an example of this difference:
A statement that a physician consorts with
harlots is not actionable per se, although a
charge that he makes improper advances to
his patients is actionable; the one statement
does not affect his reputation as a physician
whereas the other does so affect it.
Id. at
p. 194.
v. Library.
Errings,
173 N.W.2d
12Institute
(Minn.
lawyer
Sponsored In
by theBeatty
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brought an action against various defendants who, among other
things, called him a liar and a man needing psychiatric help.
The court in that case held that such charges did not directly
attack the plaintiff's professional ability but were general
attacks upon the plaintiff himself and that therefore special
damages had to be proven.
Section 571 of the Restatement of Torts provides defamation is per se if it charges a crime which is punishable by imprisonment or which is regarded by public opinion as involving
moral turpitude.
Plaintiff argues in his brief that the "obvious" inference
from the alleged statement of 27 charges is that Plaintiff was
to be charged with 27 criminal offenses or at the least that
Plaintiff had been deficient in the conduct of his office.
(Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7).
It is precisely this problem of "inference" which makes
the alleged statements of Defendants, at best, to be defamation
per quod.

It is a well-settled rule of law that in evaluating

a statement alleged to be libelous per se, the trial court must
interpret the statement alone, without the aid of inducements,
colloquialisms, innuendoes, or explanatory circumstances.

The

publication must contain defamatory words specifically directed
at the person claiming injury, which words, on their face, and
without the aid of intrinsic proof, be unmistakably recognized
as injurious.
Words which require an innuendo are not libelous
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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per se.

Paris v. Division of State Compensation Fund, 517 P.2d

1353 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Ramsey v. Zeigner, 444 P.2d 968
(N.M. 1968).

It is impossible to know from this general language of "27
charges" whether any of the charges would involve an attack
upon the professional competency of the plaintiff or would charge
him with a crime involving imprisonment or moral turpitude.

It

is just as easy to assume that the attacks were upon Plaintiff's
personal characteristics or criminal charges not involving felonies or a breach of morality.

Thus, Plaintiff argues that

when an unknown charge is made against a person it must be assumed that a per se defamation has occurred and that no showing
of special damages is necessary.

Defendants urge that this as-

sertion is incorrect and that in a case such as this involving
a general innuendo if any defamation is to be presumed it should
be presumed to have been per quod requiring the showing of special damages.

To hold otherwise gives the plaintiff the advan-

tage of not having to prove special damages while at the same
time having no clearly slanderous statements made against him.
Finally, it is doubtful that the allegations contained in
paragraphs 7 and 8 of Plaintiff's complaint give rise to a claim
for damages under either per se or per quod defamation.

These

paragraphs imply that Plaintiff's future employment may somehow
be harmed because of the statements made by Defendants.

It is

clear,
however,
words
which
only
possibly
injurious
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney that
Law Library.
Funding for
digitizationare
provided
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of Museum and
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to some vague new future employment will not give rise to a
cause of action under either per se or per quod defamation.
Gibson v. Kincaid, 221 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. App. Ct. 1967).
For these reasons the trial court was correct in holding
that the statements alleged to have been made by the defendant
school board members did not amount to a publication of an actionable slander or libel.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS TO BE PRIVILEGED.
A.
The Defendants have an Absolute Privilege to Make
Statements Concerning Plaintiff's Employment.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges several occasions of slander.
First, Plaintiff complains that he was told by the defendants
that he should resign or charges would result against him within 24 hours.

(R., p. 2).

It was obvious, however, that the

communication by Defendants with Plaintiff himself is not an
actionable slander since there was no publication to third parties.

Lenz v. Neuman, 290 P.2d 697

(Wash. 1955).

Second, Plaintiff complains that Defendants told interested
citizens that the defendants had 27 charges against the superintendent and that these charges would be made at a board meeting.
Next, Plaintiff admits that these charges were never made
at the board meeting and, in fact, that Defendants stated they
did not have charges against him except that he did not have the
support of the majority of the school board.

Finally, Plaintiff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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alleges that in spite of this public disclaimer of said charges Defendants told other persons privately that while there
were actual charges against Plaintiff they would not be brought
out because of legal consequences.
Assuming these allegations to be true, Plaintiff has not
complained of anything other than instances where three members of the school board made statements concerning Plaintiff's
conduct as an employee of the school district.
There can be no doubt that Title 53, Chapter 6 of the Utah
Code Annotated empowers the school board to directly control
the actions of the superintendent of schools including his appointment and removal.

Section 53-6-7 specifically allows the

board of education to remove an appointed or elected officer
from office for cause by a vote of two-thirds of the board.
Section 53-6-11 provides that a superintendent of schools shall
be appointed for a two-year period until his successor shall be
appointed and has qualified.
Since it is unknown from Plaintiff's complaint the identity
of the "interested" persons to whom the defendants allegedly
spoke, it can be assumed that these persons were other members
of the school board, the school board staff, or parents having
children in the school district.
Thus, any statements made concerning Plaintiff's employment
or his conduct constituted an essential duty of the school
board--in
this Lawinstance
majority
of
the
three
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Fundingconsisting
for digitization providedof
by theaInstitute
of Museum and
Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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defendants.
Section 45-2-3 provides that a privileged publication or
broadcast shall not be considered as libelous or slanderous
per se if it is made in the proper discharge of an official
duty.

It is generally held that public officials who act in an

official capacity are absolutely privileged to make any staternent, whether slanderous or not, provided the statements are
made or the actions are taken in the course of the official
duties or powers and within the scope of the official's authority.

Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 140 A.2d 100 (Penn.

1958) •
Absolute privilege is in contrast to qualified or conditional privilege which merely rebuts the inference of malice
that is imputed in the absence of privilege, and conditions
recovery on a showing of falsity or actual malice.

50 Am.Jur.2d,

Libel and Slander, Section 195.
The policy reasons behind the doctrine of absolute privilege were well stated by Justice Learned Hand who said:
[A]n official, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon
others • • • should not escape liability for
the injuries he may so cause; and, if it
were possible in practice to confine such
complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery • • • • [But] it is
impossible to know whether the claim is
well-founded until the case has been tried,
and • • • to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden
of a trial and to the inevitable darnger of
Sponsored by
the S.J.outcome,
Quinney Law Library.
Funding dampen
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but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties. Again and again the public
interest calls for action which may turn
out to be founded on a mistake, in the face
of which an official may later find himself
hardput to it to satisfy a jury of his good
faith • • • • In this instance it has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579,
581 (2nd Cir. 1949).
This Court on two occasions has held that an absolute privilege attaches to official proceedings.

In Carter v. Jackson,

351 P.2d 957, 10 Utah 2d 284 (1960) an action for slander was
undertaken against a city council member by a deputy city marshall who claimed defamation had occurred during a city council meeting.

Th~s

Court stated:

The statement of the defendant was made in
his official capacity in an official proceeding authorized by law and it had a reasonable relationship to the subject of the
meeting. The statement, therefore, was
absolutely privileged. Id. at 958.
See also Dodge v. Henriod, 444 P.2d 753

(Utah 1968)

(Statement

made in the course of a judicial proceeding and in discharge of
an official duty absolutely privileged).
Plaintiff has not in his complaint alleged that the statements made by Defendants were not made in an official capacity
nor in official proceedings.

For example, the Spring City town

meeting in which Defendant Strate allegedly made the defamatocy
statements could certainly be said to be an official function
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of a member of a school board and that he was speaking on behalf of the school board at that time.
Cases in other jurisdictions clearly hold that members
of a state school board or equivalent authority are absolutely
privileged in the investigation and handling of employment matters.
In Lombardo v. Stoke, 276 N.Y.S. 97

(Ct. App. N.Y.) a

suit was brought by two members of a college against the New
York City Board of Higher Education which had released information to the press and to the public concerning the hiring
practices of the university.

The court in that case stated:

In the case before us, the Board of Higher
Education, is undoubtedly an "important
agency" of municipal government • • • • We
have previously recognized that making
the official statements of some government
executives absolutely privileged is "essential in the conduct of official business".
In our view, the members of the defendant
Board of Higher Education are such executives and they should be free to report to
the public on appropriate occasions "without fear or reprisal by civil suit for damages".
Id. at 101.
Likewise, in Laurence University v. State, 344 N.Y.S.2d
183 N.Y. App. Div.

(1973) the court held that the Commissioner

of Education who under New York law possessed broad and comprehensive powers to enforce all laws relating to the educational
system and to execute all policies determined by the Board of
Regents had the right and duty to concern himself with the qualSponsored
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higher educational pursuits to the extent that those pursuits
added to or detracted from the quality of performance.

The

court concluded that the commissioner had authority to make
qualitative comments to other college presidents, superintendents and other institutions he deemed appropriate.
In Roberts v. Lenfestey, 264 So.2d 449 (Fla. App. 1972)
the plaintiff was an applicant for a teaching position at a
junior college.

During the course of negotiations the defen-

dant, the chief executive officer of the college in charge of
hiring, made allegedly derogatory statements against the plaintiff.

The court, in upholding the absolute privilege of the

administrator, stated that under our democratic system the
stewardship of public officials is daily observed by the public.

"It is necessary that free and open explanations of their

actions be made."

Id. at 451.

In McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 253 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 1969), the
superintendent had told the board of education that the plaintiffs' teaching was poor, that they left their rooms unattended, and they in general lacked ability as teachers.

In affir-

ming the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that the duties of the superintendent included making recommendations concerning teachers and concluded
that any such statements were absolutely privileged.
In Smith v. Helbraun, 251 N.Y.S.2d 533

(N.Y. 1964), it was

held
that
the
members
the
boardprovided
of byeducation
had
an absolute
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privilege where, in a resolution adopted by the Board, it was
stated in effect that greater progress could be made in solving educational problems of the district under new leadership
and that the presence of the plaintiff superintendent of schools
of the district was detrimental to the best interests of the
school district and to the education of the children.

The

court pointed out that the members of the board of education
had wide executive and administrative powers in the management
and control of the educational affairs and other interests
within the responsibility of the board and that in executing
their duties the members of the board performed a state function of high importance to the people and to the district and
that they were thus clothed with an absolute privilege and that
since the resolution complained of concerned the continued service of the superintendent of schools, a subject clearly within
the purview of the board of education, the statement of the
board by resolution was absolutely privileged.
See also Williams v. School District, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo.
1969), where a superintendent's comments to the board about a
school teacher were held absolutely privileged; and Brewbaker
v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 973

(Ca. 7).

See also Martin

v. Kearney, 51 Cal. App.3d 309, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281, where it
was held that a parents' letter to principal charging a teacher
with lack of judgment, rudeness, etc., was a publication within
the meaning
of a statute establishing absolute privilege with
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regard to communications between interested persons.
Other cases concerning officials not directly involved
with education are analogous.

In Schlinkert v. Henderson, 49

N.W.2d 180 (Mich. 1951) a letter written by a member of the
State Liquor Control Commission recommending rejection of an
executive director because he was not fit by temperament, capacity or experience for such a position was absolutely privileged as an official act within the scope of the writer's
duty and in the public interest.

The appellate court affirmed

the lower court's dismissal of the action.
In Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 140 A.2d 100 (Penn.
1958) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint in which it was alleged that a government official had made defamatory statements to the press concerning a contractor's quality of work.

The court held that

the public official was justified in making statements to the
public and the press concerning the quality of the plaintiff's
work since it involved an important interest of public concern.
~

1966)

also Saxon v. Knowles, 185 So.2d 194 (Fla. Ct. App.

(appellate court upholding trial court's dismissal with

prejudice of complaint alleging that city manager had maliciously and falsely slandered plaintiff's business reputation by public and newspaper statements); Ascherman v. Natanson, 100 Cal.
Rep. 656 Cal.

(Ct. App. 1972)

(absolute privilege attached to

hospital officials engaged in investigation and hearing of matSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ter delegated to them) •
In the present case, an absolute privilege attached to
any statements of the defendants and that privilege may not be
overcome except by a showing in Plaintiff's complaint that the
statements were not made within the scope of the official duties.

The fact that the defendants had a statutory right to

make such statements is clear when one reads Utah Code Annotated, Section 53-6-20 which allows a member of the board of education to "do all things needful for the maintenance, prosperity and success of the schools and the promotion of education" and Section 53-6-11 which governs the appointment of
superintendent of schools.

In addition, Section 53-4-14 allows

a school board to terminate a contract of employment for cause
at any time.
Appellant attempts to distinguish the defendants' official
duties by citing the Orderly School Termination Procedure Act
and arguing that under such act Plaintiff was entitled to sixty
days notice of termination of employment which had not been received.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11).

He argues that Defen-

dants, acting as a majority of the school board, had no right to
terminate Plaintiff at the end of the June period and that any
inquiry or charges for his resignation were not "official".
It must be noted that Plaintiff's statement concerning the
two-month period and the failure to give notice is not contained
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miss.

In addition to this fact, it is questionable whether

the Orderly School Termination Procedure Act applies to superintendents because of the inconsistencies in the statute itself--for example, the heading of the act is "Teacher's Termination Procedures"--and because superintendents are the direct agent of the school board and have never enjoyed tenure
privileges.
As stated by the Wyoming Supreme Court:
The legislature may wish at some future
time to bring superintendents within the
application of tenure provisions.
But,
on the other hand, there are reasons why
it may not wish to do so.
As representatives of the people, the Board of Education is the body charged with the primary responsibility in forming educational policy and supervising school administration.
In order for the Board to
discharge these responsibilities and be
responsive to the wishes of the electorate, it would seem essential that they
have the right to choose, in their discretion, the district's chief executive
officer. Otherwise, the Board would have
duties but would lack the necessary means
of fulfilling them.
Seyfang v. Board of
Trustees, 563 P.2d 1376 (Wyo. 1977).
Plaintiff also argues that the charges and inquiries allegedly made by the defendant school board members could not
have been germane to dismissal for cause since "They did not
have the two-thirds majority of the board required to do so."
(Appellant's brief, p. 11).

This too is an unplead assumption

which assumes that the other two school board members would
never have voted for the plaintiff's dismissal regardless of
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the charges made.
In any event, however, Plaintiff in his complaint does
not allege that Defendants were acting beyond their official
power and duties nor that they had no ability to dismiss Plaintiff as the superintendent.

For these reasons, since it must

be assumed as a matter of law that defendant school board members were acting in their official capacity they must be given
absolute privilege in any statements they allegedly made.
B.

Defendants' Statements Were Conditionally Privileged.

Assuming arguendo that the alleged statements made by Defendants were not absolutely privileged as discussed in the
preceding section there can be no question they would be entitled to a conditional or qualified privilege.
A conditional privilege protects the speaker from defamation suits except as to those occasions when the speaker makes
false defamatory statements which either (a) he in fact does
not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds for believing to be true.

Gardner v. Harrifield, 549 P.2d 266 (Ida.

1976).

In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that people such as Plaintiff who are in public positions
assume the role of a public figure and that such a person cannot recover for defamatory falsehoods relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual
malice--with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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regard of whether it was false or not.
pany v. Butts, 388

u.s.

Curtis Publishing Com-

130 (1967).

To defeat that privilege, it is encurnbent upon a plaintiff to plead and prove, as to each statement, that the statement was false and that it was written or spoken "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not".

Beatty v. Ellings, 173 N.W.2d 12 (Minn.

1969).
The court in the Beatty case noted that Plaintiff's allegation that defamatory words were "maliciously" spoken was not
a sufficient pleading of constitutional malice.

The court

noted that mere proof of personal ill will does not meet the
constitutional standard of actual malice.
In Utah,

Sect~on

76-9-506 presumes that communications

between interested persons is not malicious.

That section

states:
Communication made to a person interested
in the communication by one who is also interested, or who stands in a relation to the
former as to afford a reasonable ground for
supposing his motive innocent, is not presumed to be malicious, and is a privileged
communication.
See also Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (1935).
The plaintiff in his complaint states, "Defendants and each
of them made such statements and caused and encouraged said rurnors intentionally, deliberately, maliciously, and recklessly
for the purpose of injuring Plaintiff in his employment".
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(R.,

p. 4).

Aside from this bare assertion there is nothing in the

complaint that shows any more than ill will between Defendants
and Plaintiff.
The court in Williams v. The School District of Springfield, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969) in upholding the dismissal
of the plaintiff's complaint stated:
The allegation that Respondent Graff's
exercise of the ministerial duties was
done in a "wanton, reckless and malicious"
manner are mere conclusions not substantiated by any facts pleaded by appellant
and therefore not admitted by the motion
to dismiss.
Id. at 266.
Similarly, in Dean v. Chapman, 556 P.2d 257

(Okla. 1976) the

Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in affirming the lower court's dismissal of Plaintiff's

complain~

held that the complaint char-

ging Defendants' conduct was reckless, willful, wanton, malicious,
unlawful and grossly negligent was not sufficient to allege rnalice when there were no evidentiary facts plead in the complaint to support the legal conclusion of maliciousness.
This Court in Anderson v. Granite School District, 413 P.2d
597 (Utah 1966) applied this principle in affirming the lower
court's order of dismissal in which claims of malicious actions
on the part of Defendants were made.

This Court stated:

Except for the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that the defendants acted
maliciously and outside of their authority
in interfering with their ditch, there is
nothing whatsoever to indicate that such
was the fact.
Id. at 599.
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~~Sampson

v. Rumsey, 563 P.2d 506

(Kan. 1977)

(A court

is not required, on a motion to dismiss, to accept as true
conclusionary allegations as to the legal effect of facts set
out, if these allegations do not reasonably follow from the
description of what happened or if these allegations are contradicted by the description itself).
With this principle in mind Plaintiff's complaint fails
to show any facts upon which malice can be based.

Paragraph 2

of the complaint states that Defendants desired to remove
Plaintiff from his position as superintendent of the school
district because they did not think he possessed sufficient
character and qualifications.

Any citizen is entitled to at-

tempt to remove any official not qualified for his job and such
action cannot, alone, constitute malice.

Defendants, however,

were more than just citizens; they constituted a majority of
the board of education and were thus entitled to remove the superintendent.
Paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges that the defendants
stated to Plaintiff that he had interfered with them for the
last time and that they wanted his resignation.

If such resig-

nation did not come Defendants allegedly said they would publicize 27 charges against him.

Once again, however, Defendants

were Plaintiff's immediate supervisors and could certainly ask
for his resignation without having any vindictive or malicious
motives.
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Paragraph 4 of the complaint states that Defendants told
interested citizens that 27 charges would be brought out publicly in the next board meeting.

Again, such a statement to

"interested" persons does not show a malicious motive on the
part of the defendants but only a desire to allow public information and comment concerning the employment controversy.
Paragraph 5 alleges that the defendants denied having any
charges against Plaintiff except his ability to receive the
support of the board.

Certainly there is no malice in such an

allegation.
Paragraph 6 alleges that Defendants told other persons
privately that there were charges but they would not be brought
out because of the possible legal consequences.

Assuming this

fact to be true, Defendants' decision not to publicize the
charges was not malicious nor can it be presumed that this
decision to retract previous statements was made to harm Plaintiff--rather than vindicating him.
Even giving Plaintiff the benefit of all doubts and assuming all of his allegations are correct, there is nothing
which shows that the statements concerning the 27 charges were
made by the defendants with a motive other than their desire
for Plaintiff to resign.

Since Plaintiff himself does not know

whether or not the charges were true as alleged in paragraph
9 of his complaint, Plaintiff cannot say that they were unfounded nor maliciously formulated.
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The ill will obviously present between the parties in
this case does not constitute the actual malice necessary to
eliminate a conditional privilege.

Defendants' decision, pre-

surning that such charges existed, not to pursue the charges
was inferentially done upon legal advice and in the discretion
of the board.

Defendants had no duty to publicize these char-

ges so that Plaintiff could deny them.

And while it may have

been poor judgment on the part of the board to decline to
discuss the charges any further with the "interested persons",
the board's decision does not amount to the actual malice necessary in order to eliminate a conditional privilege.
For these reasons, therefore, even if it is assumed that
the board did not have an absolute privilege, they are entitled
to a conditional privilege since Plaintiff is unable to show
sufficient facts to justify his allegation of malice.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE IN AN ACTION FOR
SLANDER.
In addition to the absolute and conditional privilege avail·
able to public officials in defamation cases only, there exists
the general immunity provisions applicable to all governmental
employees.

Section 63-30-2 of the Governmental Immunity Act

provides that a school district is a political subdivision and
a governmental entity within the meaning of the Act.

Section 3
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mental entities are immune from suit for any injury which may
result from the activities of the entity wherein the entity
is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental
function.

Section 63-30-10 provides that immunity from suit

of governmental entities is waived for injury caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee except if the injury
"arises out of • • . libel, slander".
After the passage of the Governmental Immunity Act, the
legislature adopted the Public Employees Indemnification Act,
Title 63, Chapter 48, Utah Code Annotated.

That Act provides that

suits against governmental employees arising out of acts occurring during the performance of their duties, within the scope
of employment or under color of authority, must be defended by
the governmental entity.

The entity is required to pay any

judgment that is rendered against the employee.

There is an

exception if the acts giving rise to the suit are due tc the
gross negligence, fraud or malice.

The statute further elimi-

nates the right of the entity to common law indemnification
from the employee.
The legislature also has made it perfectly clear that a
government employee is protected from personal liability while
acting in his official duty unless he acted through gross negligence, fraud or malice.

The 1978 Amendment to the Governmental

Immunity Act evidences this intent.

Section 63-30-4, U.C.A.

(Supp.
1978).
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While the plaintiff's complaint purports to assert a
claim against the defendants in their individual capacity only,
such a statement in the complaint does not make it so; in fact,
it is obvious that the actions of the defendants were undertaken solely because of their respective positions as members
of the board of education.

Since they were acting within the

scope of their duties as provided by statute, that is, hiring,
firing, or forcing the resignation of a superintendent, they
are clearly entitled to tender the defense of this action to
the school district and the school district will ultimately
be required to defend and indemnify.

Thus, the school district

would be ultimately liable but for that provision of the Immunity Act which retains immunity for actions for libel and
slander.

Under these circumstances, the individual employees

of the governmental entity share any immunity which the entity
would otherwise have.
In Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P.626

(1913), the

plaintiff's land was damaged by the overflowing of a state canal.

Plaintiff claimed that even if the state and State Board

of Land Commissioners were immune from suit, the individual
commissioners could be held liable.

In reversing a judgment

for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held:
It is idle to contend that an action is
not against the state when it and no one
else is held responsible, and its funds
are directed to be appropriated in satisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

faction of the judgment without even-a right
to recoup its loss. To say that under such
circumstances the action is merely against
state officials or state agencies is to ignore the very essence of things.
42 Utah at
492, 134 P. at 630.
Similarly, in Anderson Investment Corp. v. State, 28 Utah
2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 (1972), suit was brought against the individual members of the State Road Commission.
dismissed the complaint.

The trial court

In affirming, the court stated:

These members in the performance of their
duties have the same immunity as does the
commission which they constitute. 28 Utah
2d at 381, 503 P.2d at 146.
In Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corp. v. Holman, 28
Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972), Plaintiff sued the state, the
Tax Commission and one of its agents.

In affirming the dis-

missal of the complaint it was specifically held:
As to the plaintiff's claim for damages it
must proceed, if at all, pursuant to the
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30, u.c.A.
(1953), known as the Governmental Immunity
Act. A prerequisite in pursuing a claim
against the state or its officers is a compliance with Section 63-30-12 [the notice
provision] • • •
It appears that the plaintiff's complaint
is fatally defective in that it does not allege compliance with that section.
(Emphasis added).
28 Utah 2d at 398-399, 503 P.2d
at 448.
The logic of these cases is clear.

If a suit, although

nominally against an individual, is in reality and substance a
suit against a governmental entity, then the procedures, exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceptions and limitations that apply to the governmental entity
must apply to the suit against the individual.
The same position has been also adopted by the highest
courts of other states, e.g., Schreder v. Veatch, 337 P.2d 814
(Ore. 1959); State Highway Comm. v. Green-Boots Const. Co.,
187 P.2d 209 (Okla. 1947).
Thus, the defendants are immune not only because the entity of which they are officers is immune, but also because
the plaintiff has failed to comply with or to allege compliance
with the appropriate provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act.
There is no allegation in Plaintiff's complaint that the
three defendants were not acting in official capacities as members of the North Sanpete School Board.

There is also no alle-

gation showing that their actions in confronting Plaintiff were
not done in good faith on their honest belief that Plaintiff
was not qualified to hold the office.

Absent a pleading of

facts showing actual, malicious, and evil motive of the conduct
of Defendants the Governmental Immunity Act protects these individuals from a suit of this nature.
In Anderson v. Granite School District, 413 P.2d 597
1966) the court stated the rule as follows:
It is a little difficult for us to regard in a serious light the plaintiffs'
asserted claim for $80,000 punitive damages against the defendant School Board
individually.
In common
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(Utah

other public officials, they have authority to do whatever is reasonably necessary in carrying out the duties imposed
upon them.
It would be quite impractical
and unfair to require them to act at their
own risk. This would not only be disruptive of the proper functioning of public
institutions, but undoubtedly would dissuade competent and responsible persons
from accepting the responsibilities of public office. Accordingly, it is the settled policy of the law that when a public
official acts in good faith, believing
what he does to be within the scope of his
authority and in the line of his duty, he
is not liable for damages even if he makes
a mistake in the exercise of his judgment.
Id. at 599.
Aside from Plaintiff's conclusionary statement in the complaint
that the action of Defendants was done maliciously there is
nothing in the factual context of the complaint which shows
bad faith on the part of the defendants or their belief they
were not acting on behalf of the school board.
Even this Court's recent decision of Cornwall v. Larsen,
571 P.2d 925 (1977) does not affect the immunity in this case
since Defendants were exercising discretionary powers--not
ministerial--at the time of the alleged slander and, furthermore, were not in violation of any specific statute as was the
police officer in Cornwall.
Therefore, the trial court was correct in finding immunity
on behalf of the defendants through the Governmental Immunity
Act.
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CONCLUSION
Defendants' alleged statements concerning the "27 charges" do not amount to a slander per se.

It would be impossible

for a listener of such a statement to know what kind of charge
was being made by the defendants and only by innuendoes could
any derogatory fact concerning Plaintiff's profession be found.
At most, the "27 charges" statements are libel per quod in that
they are general allegations which may or may not have gone to
the professional competence of the plaintiff.

As such, there-

fore, it was necessary for the plaintiff to plead actual damages if he was to sustain his burden during the motion to dismiss.
Even assuming arguendo that a slander was made, the defendants are absolutely privileged from any statements they made
when acting in their official capacity regardless of their motive or intentions.

This rule has been developed especially

to protect government officials from the "catch-all" tort of
slander and libel and protects government officials and officers
from a myriad of lawsuits which could result from public statements or public actions concerning individuals.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that an absolute
privilege did not attach to Defendants with regard to slander
there can be no dispute that a conditional privilege attached.
This privilege could only be lost in the showing of actual malice
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plaint while making conclusionary statements of malice did not
allege sufficient facts to justify such a conclusion.
Finally, regardless of the special area of slander irnmunity provided to officials in the form of absolute privilege
and conditional privilege, Defendants are entitled to the protection of the Governmental Immunity Act applicable to all ernployees as they acted in their official duties and in good
faith.

There is no showing in Plaintiff's complaint that De-

fendants did not act in their capacity as members of the school
board with the function of supervising and administering the
employees of the district or that their actions and statements
were not made in good faith for the benefit of the school sys-

tern.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 1978.
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